Children ranging from 4 to 8 years (n = 39) reported whether they could imagine various improbable phenomena (e.g., a person making onion juice) as well as various impossible phenomena (e.g., a person turning an onion into a banana) and then described what they imagined. In their descriptions, children mentioned ordinary causes much more often than extraordinary causes. Descriptions of such ordinary causes were provided more often in relation to improbable (rather than impossible) phenomena. Following these imaginative efforts, children judged if each phenomenon could really happen. To check whether these reality judgments were affected by children's attempts to imagine, a control group (n = 39) made identical reality judgments but were not first prompted to imagine each phenomenon. Children across the age range judged that impossible phenomena cannot really happen but, with increasing age, judged that improbable phenomena can happen. This pattern emerged in both the imagination and control groups; thus simply prompting children to imagine did not alter their reality judgments. However, within the imagination group, judgments that phenomena can really happen were associated with children's claims to have successfully imagined the phenomena and with certain characteristics of their descriptions: imagining ordinary causes and imagining phenomena obtain. Results highlight close links between imagination and reality judgments in childhood. Contrary to the notion that young children have a rich imagination that readily defies reality, results indicate that their imagination is grounded in reality, as are their beliefs.
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Introduction
In everyday parlance, the imagination is often associated with flights of fancy in which unexpected, and even impossible, outcomes are entertained. According to popular wisdom, children easily and regularly represent improbable and indeed impossible outcomes in their imagination; consider the proliferation of fantastical phenomena in children's books, television shows, and movies. Yet research suggests that very young children transpose their understanding of everyday causal constraints to the makebelieve world (Harris, 2000) . Two-year-olds readily imagine ordinary outcomes -e.g., pretend tea pouring downward into a cup, or liquid wetting a surface that it is spilled upon. Moreover, young children often prefer stories with ordinary occurrences and ones that are purportedly factual, over those with extraordinary occurrences or that are purportedly make believe (Barnes, Bernstein, & Bloom, 2015; Sobel & Weisberg, 2014; Weisberg, Sobel, Goodstein, & Bloom, 2013) . In the present study, we explore this potential tension between everyday assumptions about the richness of the child's imagination and empirical findings implying its close links to reality, by asking how far children's imagination is constrained by what they know about real-world causality.
In addition to asking about the possible constraints that children's causal knowledge imposes on their imagination, we also ask how the act of imagining a given phenomenon influences children's judgments about whether or not that phenomenon can http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2016.03.022 0010-0277/Ó 2016 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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